CARVAJAL V. CA G.R. No. 98328. October 9, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner is the applicant in a land registration case filed with Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of
the Fourth Judicial Region stationed in Antipolo, Rizal. Sought to be brought by petitioner under the operation of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) is a 96,470 square meter lot denominated as Lots6846-A, 6846-B, 6846-C and 6846-D. Copies of the application were ordered by respondent Court to be furnished (to) the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) which on March 18, 1987 submitted a report recommending that applicant be ordered to amend his petition by including the names and complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners and correcting the discrepancy regarding the boundary lot number along line 2-3 of Lot 6846-D on plan Csd-04-005516-D.
On order of respondent Court [trial court], the petition was accordingly amended.
On June 22, 1988, private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. filed its opposition stating that a land registered in its name under the Torrens System and covered by then TCT No. N-7873 is almost identical to the property subject of the application by petitioner. On June 28, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to lift the order of general default and to admit its opposition on the ground that its right would be adversely affected by the application. In the same order dated July 1, 1988, respondent Court in the interest of justice set aside the order of general default in so far as private respondent was concerned and admitted private respondent's opposition.
During the hearings conducted on September 13, 1988, September 27, 1988, October 4, 1988, October 11, 1988, October 11, 1988, November 22, 1988, December 6, 1988, petitioner presented his evidence on the question as to whether or not he had a registrable right over the land in question.
On February 28, 1989, the petitioner's application for registration was dismissed.
On March 13, 1989, petitioner filed his motion to reconsider the February 28, 1989 dismissal of the application for registration to which private respondent filed an opposition dated March 20, 1989.
The motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated March 4, 1989.
On May 2, 1989 petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider the dismissal of his petition. The second motion to reconsider the dismissal of the application for registration was denied in an order dated July 5, 1989.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was given (the) chance and the opportunity to be heard or
allowed to fully introduce his evidence in the (proceeding) for Land Registration and (to) rest (his) case.
HELD:
NO. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process. In this case, petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and he did present three. However, petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness stand even when the trial court ordered the submission of the parties memoranda which signified the termination of the proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the termination of the case, he forfeited his right to take the witness stand.
Likewise, we are not persuaded by his allegation that his own counsel hardly participated in the proceedings. The records show that said counsel did cross-examine Engineer Silverio Perez by propounding clarificatory questions to the latter. In any event, the client is generally bound by the acts of his counsel. Petitioner has not shown at all that his previous counsel had acted in such grossly negligent manner as to deprive him of effective representation, or of due process.
In support of his contention, petitioner cites Tirona vs. Naawa which held:
We hold the view, however that respondent Judge erred when he ordered the dismissal of the registration case over the objection of the oppositors; and when he refused to reconsider the order of dismissal and reinstate the case he had neglected to perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, and had thereby deprived the oppositors of a right to which they are entitled.
Such ruling finds no application to the present case, because neither Respondent Mariano Raymundo (the applicant in the land registration case) nor Petitioner Constantino Tirona (the oppositor in the cited case) was a holder of any certificate of title over the land intended for registration. Such being the case, the land registration court was ordered to act in accordance with Section 37 of Act No. 496[22] either by dismissing the application if none of the litigants succeeded in showing a proper title or by entering a decree awarding the land applied for to the person entitled thereto.