CORONA V. UHPAP G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997
FACTS:
The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created through PD 505, as amended by PD857 to “control, regulate, supervise pilots and the pilot age profession”.
The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created through PD 505, as amended by PD857 to “control, regulate, supervise pilots and the pilot age profession”.
After hearing from relevant government agencies, pursuant to said charter, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued Administrative Order 04-92 [PPA-AO 04-92] and corresponding Memorandum Order in 1992, stating that all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilot age districts shall be only for a term of one year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance” to regulate and improve pilot services by instilling discipline and give better protection to port users.
PPA-AO 04-92 replaces PPA-AO 03-85 which succinctly provides that, aspiring pilots must have a license and train as probationary pilots, and only upon satisfactory performance, are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself and to exercise harbor pilot age until they reach the age of 70.
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPAs administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body.
PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-92 which laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots on August 31, 1992.
UHPAP filed for suspension of the MO but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA.
Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.
The OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92.
In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P. D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services.
The OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district.
Secretary opined in its order that The exercise of ones profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointees performance.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPAs jurisdictional area.
Secretary Corona also cited section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires the PPA to consult with “relevant Government agencies.” Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the secretaries of the DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Finance, and the Department of Environment and natural Resources, as well as the Director General of the National Economic Development Agency, the MARINA, and the private sector representative who, due to his knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that the law has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition before the RTC of Manila which declared PPA Admin. Order 04-92 and its implementing Circular Orders null and void.
ISSUE:
WON the PPA violate respondents right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law in issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation?
HELD:
YES. After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents right against deprivation of property without due process of law.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the due process clause of the Constitution, viz.:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x.
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced, while substantive due process requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just. [14] PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby relevant government agencies and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, where it declared that (a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots examinations, was not consulted, the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted.
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.
Furthermore,It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of performance which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term renewal. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.