DANS V. PEOPLE G.R. No. 127073. January 29, 1998
FACTS:
Sometime in 1984, then Minister of Human Settlements Imelda R. Marcos and then Transportation and Communications Minister Jose P. Dans, Jr., petitioners herein, entered into several contracts involving the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI). Concurrently and respectively, Marcos and Dans served as ex-oficio Chairman and ex-oficio Vice-Chairman of the LRTA, and as Chairman and Director of the Board of Trustees of the PGHFI.
By virtue of these agreements, which were authorized and in fact ratified by the LRTA Board of Directors, two vacant LRTA lots located in Pasay City, and lot in Sta. Cruz, Manila, were leased out to the PGHFI.
Specifically, the LRTA and the PGHFI, represented by Dans and Marcos, respectively, approved three deeds, namely, an Agreement for the Development of the Areas Adjacent to the Light Rail Transit System Stations and the Management and Operation of the Concession Areas Therein,[1] and two lease agreements[2] dated June 8 and June 18, 1984, covering the Pasay and the Sta. Cruz lots.
The terms of the lease agreements were identical except as to the price: the lease would be good for 25 years subject to an annual escalation of 7.5%.
PGHFI had the right to sublease the lots; and the monthly lease was P102,760.00 for the Pasay lot and P92,437.20 for the Sta. Cruz lot.
Within the same month, the Pasay lot was subleased by PGHFI, through Marcos, to Transnational Construction Corporation (TNCC) for P734,000.00 a month, while the Sta. Cruz lot was allegedly subleased to Joy Mart Consolidated Corporation (Joy Mart) for P199,710.00 per month.
Because of these deeds, petitioners were charged of crimes in violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
A total of Five (5) separate cases were filed against petitioners. Marcos and Dans were separately charged under Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452 for accepting employment in and/or acting as Chairman and Director, respectively, of the PGHFI while the latter had pending business (the lease agreements) with the LRTA, which they both also headed. With regard to the other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17450 and 17453, the accusations against both of them stemmed from the contracts they signed in representation of the LRTA and of the PGHFI which were allegedly entered into under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Petitioners pleaded not guilty to all of the charges.
Before trial could commence, Dans moved for the advance examination of defense witness Ramon F. Cuervo, Jr., a real estate broker, appraiser and friend of Dans who, as an expert witness, was in a position to inform the court that the agreed lease prices stated in the subject agreements were fair based on standard industry valuation standards.
The court a quo granted said motion, and Cuervo was allowed to testify on August 12, 13, and 19, 1992. During this time, Marcos never questioned Cuervo and later expressed that she had no desire to further examine him.
The court issued an order admitting all the exhibits except Exhibits D and E as to Dans, who challenged the two sublease agreements, and Exhibit E-1 as to Marcos, who, while accepting the validity of said sublease agreement, nevertheless questioned the authenticity of her signature thereon.
Dans filed a Motion to Dismiss but the court denied the same, as well as his motion for reconsideration thereof.
By the time the case was submitted for decision, Marcos had neither submitted a formal offer of evidence, despite notice of the courts orders to do so, nor the required memorandum. She did file a motion for inhibition of the justices of the Sandiganbayans First Division on the ground of pre-judgment of her case based on the courts denial of Dans demurrer to evidence, but this was denied in the courts
On September 24, 1993, The court a quo rendered judgment, acquitting petitioners in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451, and 17452, but convicting them in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453.
Petitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration which respondent court promulgated two resolutions, one denying the motion of Dans, and another denying that of Marcos and modifying the assailed September 24, 1993, decision with the addition of a sixth paragraph in the dispositive portion which dealt with the civil liability of petitioners.
Aggrieved, petitioners separately elevated their case to SC for a review.
The Court resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raise similar issues and seek the same reliefs.
One of the few issues raised by Imelda Marcos is the constitutionality of Sec 3 (g) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. According to her, the section is vague and superfluous. She claims that the phrase manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government is vague for it does not set a definite standard by which the court will be guided, thus, leaving it open to human subjectivity.Petitioners were charged with and found guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. It states thus:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
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(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
ISSUE:
WON Sec 3 (g) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is unconstitutional on the ground of vagueness
HELD:
NO. There is, however, nothing vague about the statute. The assailed provision answers the basic query What is the violation? Anything beyond this, the hows and the whys, are evidentiary matters which the law itself cannot possibly disclose in view of the uniqueness of every case. The disadvantage in this instance is something that still has to be addressed by the States evidence as the trial progresses. It may be said that the law is intended to be flexible in order to allow the judge a certain latitude in determining if the disadvantage to the government occasioned by the act of a public officer in entering into a particular contract is, indeed, gross and manifest.
The personal circumstances of an accused are, in this regard, also immaterial, because of the nature of the statute. As the Court declared in Luciano,
. . . In other words, the act treated thereunder partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act (No.) 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Note that the law does not merely contemplate repression of acts that are unlawful or corrupt per se, but even of those that may lead to or result in graft and corruption. Thus, to require for conviction under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act that the validity of the contract or transaction be first proved would be to enervate, if not defeat, the intention of the Act.