GALVEZ V. CA G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
FACTS:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash.
In the meantime, prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration to Judge Villajuan that the reinstatement of the original informations be granted. Judge Villajuan granted the MR.
On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the ground that there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof.
In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position.
Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a new information.
Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that—“The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.”