STATE PROSECUTORS V. JUDGE MURO A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
FACTS:
Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the President of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.
The petitioners stressed that this is not just a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
Moreover, Petitioner’s alleged that the judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice on the published statement of the President in the newspaper (Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe)which is a matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?
HELD:
YES. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact. Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.
When the President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent judge admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.
For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration.
This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is possessed with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof.
The SC cited several cases where judges were ordered dismissed from the government service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law and the Court after considering such premises, it thus, finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government service.