WEBB V. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995
FACTS:
l Accused Hubert Webb et. Al, the prime suspects of the sensational Visconde Rape with Homicide case filed petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with an application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
l The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuño to conduct the preliminary investigation.
l During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following:
(1) the sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the crime;
(2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the former housemaids of the Webb family in the persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S. Gaviola;
(3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound for New York and who expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip;
(4) the sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated the manner of how Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar;
(5) the sworn statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and the sworn statements of Normal White, a security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted and they showed that Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen (19). The genital examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa.
l Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for Production And Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the documents he’s asking.
l The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents.
l Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992.
l His alibi was corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela Francisco.
l To further support his defense, he submitted documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car.
l while in the United States on said dates and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No. A8818707 on June 14, 1991.
l Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808.
l On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents.
l Judge Raul de Leon (J.Escano’s pairing judge) issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
l Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused because Judge Escano inhibited himself to the case.
l Webb, Lejano and Gatchalian voluntary surrendered to the police authorities.
l Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause.
l They insist that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated.
l They hammer on alleged material inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements.
l They assail her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blonde. T
l hey also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn statements of the witnesses for the NBI.
ISSUE/S:
WHETHER OR NOT:
l Respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them:
l the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide;
l the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and
l the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.
HELD
1. NO. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
l Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.
l Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise, judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
l Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law34 repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.
2. NO. The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners.
l Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement.
l The DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies did not erode the credibility of Alfaro.
l In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having reservations when she first executed the first statement and held back vital information due to her natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently explained especially especially so where there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value of Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and credit.
l As it has been often noted, ex parte statements are generally incomplete because they are usually executed when the affiant's state of mind does not give her sufficient and fair opportunity to comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in full the incidents which transpired;
l In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been committed and what is clear before us is that the totality of the evidence submitted by the complainant indicate a prima facie case that respondents conspired in the perpetration of the imputed offense.
l The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,31 while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
3. NO. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them.
l Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by appearing in the initial hearing, second hearing, by filing a "Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents" , "Reply to the compliance and Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence" , "Comment and Manifestation", "Counter-Affidavit", and a "Motion to Resolve", ETC.
l Moreover, It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the preliminary investigation was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the panel continued to conduct further proceedings.
l The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. This directly disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the resolution was done with indecent haste in violation of the rights of the petitioners. During the period of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and present additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.
l This notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the termination of the preliminary investigation.
l Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the conduct of the preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and filed the Information in court against them.
4. NO. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit Program And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its Section 10.
l Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-inclusion in the criminal Complaint or Information.
l The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 11938 which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.